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Abstract 
Since the 1980s, policies related to outsourcing have steadily emerged in both the private sector and public sector. Indeed, the
topics of procurement and outsourcing attract a lot of attention from practitioners and researchers alike. In the private sector,
there are many studies discussing how to develop an efficient supplier-buyer relationship in order to optimize an outsourcing 
strategy; however, few studies discuss similar topics for the public sector. In this paper, we discuss the supplier-buyer 
relationship in public procurement and outsourcing based on four different role expectation segments of private suppliers: 
operator, agent, professional, and partner. While the role expectation for an operator is emphasized in the execution of a public
buyer’s request, a role expectation for a partner is more collaborative and involves risk sharing. While the role expectation for an 
agent is based upon business outsourcing, a role expectation for a professional is based upon a specific task. In addition, the
paper also investigates market competition in Taiwan’s public procurement and outsourcing based on supplier segmentation. The 
results show that in the four segments of private suppliers, the market competition for the operator segment is the most 
competitive because it has the most tenderers in the tendering process; on the other hand, in the cases of finding an agent or a
professional, the contract price is positively related to the number of tenderers.These results can help managers in the private
sector and officers in the public sector to understand the market competition of governmental procurement and outsourcing, and 
also help them optimize the outcome by developing an appropriate public-private relationship. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s, numerous studies and cases related to procurement and outsourcing in the public sector have been 
published. There are numerous reasons why scholars and politicians encourage governments to outsource public services: 
government’s fiscal restraints, initiatives to shrink the size of the public sector, and market-based reform of public services
delivery to increase efficiency.  
For instance, Hodge (2000) proposed the public choice theory and advocated that government-centered program delivery is 
usually less efficient and effective; thus, the government should focus on core objectives and the delivery of public service 
should be privatized as much as possible. 
In the emerging trends of public management, as governments become more dependent on the private sector to meet 
sophisticated citizens’ needs, how to effectively manage public-private relationships becomes an important issue for public 
officers. However, maintaining a public-private relationship is not an easy job; cross-organizational relationships are often 
complicated and require skilful management (Dyer, Cho, Su, and Chu, 1998). Even in the private sector, which is arguably more 
flexible and free than the public sector, there are similar problems. Lee and Humphreys (2007) revealed that in regard to supply
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management in the private sector, the failure rate of adopting partnering inter-firm relationships was estimated to be around 30-
50% (Anderson and Jap, 2005).  
Wong, Tjosvold and Zhang (2005) indicate that a major source of failures in joint ventures and other alliances is that 
organizational representatives fail to forge an effective relationship. Thus, this study intends to investigate the different public-
private relationships that exist in public procurement and outsourcing cases. We suggest that the choice and deployment of 
different public-private relationship should match the conditions of the procurement and outsourcing scenario to create value; if a 
public-private relationship is managed with an inappropriate style, distrust among officers and managers might increase, 
ultimately preventing the optimal outcome and value capture of public outsourcing. 
Although substantial literature exists on the nature of public-private partnership, few studies systematically examine the 
management and governance of the public-private relationship. The aim of this paper is to examine such a relationship. The 
results can help managers in the private sector and officers in the public sector to understand the different segments of the public-
private relationship in terms of the role expectation for suppliers in public procurement and outsourcing. The paper also intends
to help officers and managers enhance the outcome by developing an appropriate public-private relationship, based on segment 
analysis, and also to understand the market competition of governmental procurement and outsourcing environment. 
2. Conceptual framework 
2.1 Government procurement and the role of operator  
Traditionally, the government has performed a majority of its responsibilities with public employees. Consequently, the 
primary mission of public procurement was the acquisition of goods, supplies, and equipment to enable public employees to 
successfully discharge their responsibilities (Lawther and Martin, 2005).  
In traditional public procurement and contracting relationships, the government usually keeps a buyer/seller arm’s length 
relationship with a private supplier. A government typically requests supplies, materials, equipment, or services by standardized
uniform speculation. The government usually opens tendering procedure, adopts a formal sealed bidding and awards a contract to 
the lowest bidder. The job of a procurement officer is similar to an auditor in that the position’s main task is to monitor suppliers 
and contractors rather than proactively working with suppliers and contractors to find solutions. Therefore, the role of a supplier
is expected to be an operator to fulfil procurement goals in accordance with the speculation of a contract and follow the 
instructions of the public sector buyer.  
2.2 Government request for of proposal (RFP) and the role of professionals 
Bradbury and Waechter (2009) propose another reason for privatizing government services: the government does not have 
the necessary expertise, experience, or equipment to deliver a given service. In this case, the government will usually give 
informative guidelines about the needs, requirements, and outcome expectations of the procurement, but will request a proposal,
organize a reviewing committee, and ask a qualified supplier to present the proposal and answer questions to the committee. The
committee will award the contract to the most advantageous tender.  
The case of RFP is different from traditional government procurement. The government allows negotiations before and 
after the contract because private firms might have specialized knowledge or a range of means to accomplish the goals or 
outcomes requested by the RFP, some of which may involve unproven technologies. The supplier is expected to be a 
professional and to fulfil procurement goals by offering expertise, knowledge, or providing necessary resources. Thus, the 
government cannot keep a buyer/seller arm’s length relationship with a private supplier; instead, discussion and collaboration is
common in RFP cases. 
2.3 Government outsourcing and the role of agents 
Belcourt (2006) indicates that outsourcing occurs when an organization contracts with another organization to provide 
services or products of a major function or activity. Work that is traditionally done internally is shifted to an external provider, 
and the employees of the original organization are often transferred to the service provider. For reasons of probity and 
accountability, this transfer is usually done by way of a competitive tender. The principal-agent relationship is often forged 
because the agent possesses a greater abundance of the needed skills, abilities, and/or time to perform the desired activities.
Bradbury and Waechter (2009) suggest a government can adopt an outsourcing policy related to a public service if three 
criteria are met: if its performance can be specified in advance and validly measured, the cost can be minimized via economies of
scale, and effective contract oversight can be maintained.  
The difference between a regular buyer-supplier relationship and an outsourcing relationship lies in the fact that 
outsourcing is not simply a purchasing decision. Outsourcing represents the fundamental decision to reject the internalization of 
an activity, which makes it a highly strategic decision (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000). Hence, an outsourcing relationship has the 
potential to impact the whole organization. 
Importantly, outsourcing enables the government to retain control over the specification of the service, the management of 
the contract, and the evaluation of the service provider’s performance (Jensen and Stoneacash, 2005). Outsourcing differs from 
alliances or partnerships or joint ventures in that there is no profit sharing or mutual contribution (Belcourt, 2006). Thus, the 
supplier is expected to be an agent of the government buyer in the outsourcing cases.
408  Weichen Tenu and Tien-Tien Liao / Systems Engineering Procedia 2 (2011) 406 – 411
          
2.4 Public-private partnerships and the role of investors 
Since 1990, a new model of public procurement, public-private partnership, has been discussed and implemented by many 
countries as governments seek to encourage private investment in capital intensive sectors (such as infrastructure) while limiting 
public expenditure due to concerns over public deficits. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) definition, a public-private partnership is an arrangement whereby the private sector provides 
infrastructure assets and services that traditionally were provided by government: public-private partnership projects include 
hospitals, schools, prisons, roads, bridges, tunnels, and railways. Cases where the private operator has some responsibility for
asset maintenance and improvement are also described as concessions. While there is no clear agreement on what does or does 
not constitute a public-private partnership, it should involve the transfer of risk from the government to the private sector (OECD, 
2007). 
Vining and Boardman (2008) propose that there are three major rationales for governments to choose public-private 
partnerships. The first rationale is the minimization of on-budget government expenditures and/or the desire to not increase the
current debt levels. The second derives from the private sector’s ability to provide infrastructure and services at a lower cost due 
to economies of scale, greater experience, better incentives, and greater ability to innovate. The third rational relates to the
government’s desire to reduce risk, not only during the design and construction phase but also during the operating phase. 
Regéczi (2005) indicates that public-private partnerships represent a new form of network governance, potentially offering 
flexibility, economic efficiencies, and non-government participation in policy development. Supporters of public-private 
partnerships assume one of two forms: market-oriented advocates and network-government enthusiasts. The former believe 
partnerships harness private sector money and bring a budget-minded management style to public sector projects; the latter see 
partnerships as a new form of government representing a third way to govern relations in society. 
Ruuska andTeigland (2009) indicates that public-private partnerships are inter-organizational project-based organizations 
consisting of members from both the public and private sectors, and are co-operations between actors developing mutual 
products and/or services in which risk, costs, and benefits are shared. A partnership is more than a contract for services; it 
represents a long-term relationship between public and private actors where risks and decision making are shared. Grimsey and 
Lewis (2004) suggest that partnerships centre on conflict management, team building, trust, commitment, and mutual goals.  
2.5 Tendering procedure for procurement and award of contracts 
The role expectation of a supplier could be reflected in the tendering procedure for procurement and awarding of contracts. 
In Taiwan, there are open tendering procedures, selective tendering procedures, and limited tendering procedures. The open 
tendering procedure is defined by procedures under which a public notice is given to invite all interested suppliers to submit 
tenders. The selective tendering procedure is defined by procedures under which a public notice is given to invite all interested
suppliers to submit their qualification documents for pre-qualification evaluation based upon specific qualification requirements;
after the evaluation is performed, qualified suppliers are invited to tender. The limited tendering procedure is defined by 
procedures under which no public notice is given and two or more suppliers are invited to compete or only one supplier is invited
for tendering. 
 If a public procurement case adopts the limited tendering procedure, the role expectation to a supplier tends to be a 
professional. This is because under the provisions of Taiwan’s Government Procurement Act, the limited tendering procedure is 
suggested where the subject of procurement is a prototype or a subject first produced or supplied that is developed in the course
of research, experiment, or original development; or is the case of contracts for professional services, technical services, or
information services. 
In addition, under the provisions of Taiwan’s Government Procurement Act, government agencies may award contracts on 
the basis of either the lowest or the most advantageous (best value) bid. If a public procurement awards a contract to the lowest
price bid, the supplier is expected to be an operator. On the other hand, if a public procurement awards the contract on the basis
of the most advantageous bid, the supplier is expected to be an agent or a professional.  
In the above summary of the literature, we suggest that there are four supplier segments typically found in public-private 
relationships: operator, professional, agent, and investor. A government can choose a tendering procedure and develop a certain
relationship with a supplier on the basis of public competence as well as resources. If a government possesses competence and 
knowledge, it can adopt an open tendering procedure and maintain an arm’s length relationship with a supplier to monitor the 
supplier’s outcome. If the government does not have enough resources due to existing fiscal constraints, it can outsource the 
public service to a supplier and maintain a principle-agent relationship to manage the supplier’s performance. If a government 
does not have enough knowledge regarding a public service or project, the government can find a professional to keep a 
consultant relationship or find a partner to invest in the project if the government lacks resources. A summary of different 
supplier roles is listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Four different supplier roles 
Public competence 
Public resources High Low 
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High Operator Professional 
Low Agent Investor 
3. Methodology and data analyses 
In order to help public officers and private managers understand the public tendering market based on the four supplier 
segments, a statistic analysis, based on government data provided by Taiwan’s Public Construction Commission, was conducted. 
The data are based on the publication of awarded tenders for 2010 from three public agencies: Council for Cultural Affairs, 
National Science Council, and Council of Labor Affairs. Table 2 shows the data summary of awarded tenders: all procurement 
cases were a private supplier bidding for a public service. 
The authors invited three experienced managers and officers to categorize procurement cases based on the four segments of 
supplier role expectations. The procurement case that adopts the lowest price bid is categorized as an operator. The procurement
that invites a supplier to invest is categorized as an investor. Differentiating between the professional and agent segments is
somewhat difficult; categorization is based on the consensus of three experienced officers and managers. If a procurement case is
based upon business outsourcing and the duration of the contract is at least one year, the procurement is likely to be categorized
as to an agent. If a procurement case is based upon a specific task and the duration of the contract is less than a year, the 
procurement is likely to be categorized as to a professional. Table 2 illustrates the market data of the four supplier expectation 
segments. 
Table 2. Tenderer summary of three public agencies in Taiwan for the year 2010  
Role of supplier Operator Professional Agent Investor Total 
Cases 31 107 56 1 195 
Tenderer mean 5.48 2.30 1.64 
Tenderer deviation 4.02 2.14 1.14 
Mean of contract price (NT$) 1,520,266 2,532,620 8,731,351 33,540,000 
A one-way ANOVA analysis was conducted to investigate the relationship between the role expectation of a supplier and 
the number of tenderers. Since there was only one case in the investor segment, it was not included in the ANOVA analysis; 
therefore, the factor “role of supplier” only has three levels in the analysis: operator, professional, and agent. The results are
given in Table 3. The role expectation of supplier in public procurement has a significant effect on the number of tenderers.  
Table 3. Results of a one-way ANOVA for the number of tenderers 
Sum of squares Df Mean square F Sig. 
Between groups 318.744 2 159.372 29.297 .000*** 
Within groups 1039.029 191 5.440 
Total 1357.773 193 
Note: ***P<0.001 
In order to assess which levels in the factor “role of supplier” had a significant effect on the number of tenderers, a post-hoc
analysis using Scheffe’s test was used. The results are listed in Table 4: the number of tenderers in the segment of operator is
significantly different from that in the segments of agent or professional. 
Table 4. Post-hoc Scheffe test for the number of tenderers 
95% confidence interval 
Group 
Groups Mean difference Std. error Sig. 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Agent Professional -.66 .38 .236 -1.61 .29 
Operator -3.84* .52 .000 -5.13 -2.55 
Professional Agent -.66 .38 .236 -.29 1.61 
Operator -3.18* .48 .000 -4.36 -2.01 
Operator Agent 3.84* .52 .000 2.55 5.13 
Professional 3.18* .48 .000 2.01          4.36  
Note: *P<0.05 
In addition, we employed a linear regression analysis to investigate the effect of contract price on the number of tenderers in
the role expectation segments of agent and professional, the results are given in Table 5. In those segments, the contract price has 
a significantly positive relationship with the number of tenderers; the larger the contract price, the more is the number of 
tenderers.  
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Table 5. Coefficientsa
Model Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
Collinearity statistics 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 5.392 .417 12.934 .000 
Agent -4.278 .554 -.733 -7.726 .000 .437 2.291 
Professional -3.246 .472 -.610 -6.879 .000 .499 2.003 
Contract price .000 .154 2.203 .029 .808 1.238 
a Dependent variable: number of tenderers 
4. Discussion  
On the basis of the data analyses, the operator segment is the most competitive in the public procurement market, but its 
mean contract price is the smallest compared to other segments. The procurement in the operator segment usually involves 
requests for supplies, material, equipment, or services by standardized uniform speculations and the contract budget scale is 
usually not high, and therefore, the barriers for the tender bid are low and the procurement easily attracts many tenderers in an 
open tendering procedure. Since the specification is usually set clearly for an operator, the public officer tends to keep an arm’s 
length relationship before and after the contract is awarded. 
In addition, when the government outsources a major function or activity traditionally done internally to an external agent or 
tries to find a professional service to fulfil a task, the contract budget scale of procurement for an agent is usually more than that 
for finding a professional supplier. Nonetheless, the level of competitiveness between these two segments is not significantly 
different because the mean numbers of tenderers for the two segments were not statistically significant in the post-hoc Scheffe
test. This result implies that the level of market competitiveness for an agent and a professional supplier are similar. 
Although there is only one case in the procurement for an investor in this study, the result demonstrates that the procurement 
will still attract few tenderers due to the large contract size. 
On the basis of the regression results, in the cases of finding an agent or a professional, the number of tenderers is positively
correlated to the contract price. The tenders with small contract prices will not necessarily attract many tenderers. This may be
due to the small profit.  
The public institution may also be a factor influencing the number of tenderers because of the differing features and/or 
culture. Further research is necessary to investigate these hypotheses.  
5. Conclusions and limitation 
This paper discussed the supplier-buyer relationship in the public procurement and outsourcing process based on four 
segments of the role expectation of private suppliers: operator, agent, professional, and partner. While the role expectation of
operator is emphasized in the execution of a public buyer’s request, the role expectation of partner is more collaborative in nature,
involving risk sharing. While the role expectation of agent is related to the outsourcing of a business process, the role expectation 
of professional is more task-oriented.  
In addition, the paper also investigated market competition in public procurement and outsourcing in Taiwan based on 
supplier segmentation. The results show that among the four segments of private suppliers, the market competition for the 
operator segment is the most competitive in terms of the highest number of tenderers; on the other hand, in the cases of finding
an agent or a professional, the contract price is positively related to the number of tenderers. 
The paper’s findings can help managers in the private sector and officers in the public sector to understand market 
competition of governmental procurement and outsourcing, and also help stakeholders optimize the outcome by developing an 
appropriate public-private relationship. 
The main limitation of the paper is the limited scope of data used in statistical analysis: the data only represented three 
public agencies in Taiwan; thus, the findings might only generalize to the local cultural context in Taiwan. We suggest 
conducting further extended research or cross-validation studies in other countries with wider and more varied samples. 
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